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FEDERAL  COURTS,  PRACTICE  &  PROCEDURE
THE  ENDURING  CHALLENGES  FOR
HABEAS CORPUS
Diane P. Wood*
Habeas Corpus: You may have the body
INTRODUCTION
The late great physicist Richard Feynman is thought once to have said “If
you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don’t understand quan-
tum mechanics.”1  Or maybe the idea expressed in that quip came from Niels
Bohr, who is quoted as saying, “Anyone who is not shocked by quantum the-
ory has not understood it.”2  For our purposes, it does not matter who said it
first: the key point is that there are some fields for which a little knowledge
actually conceals the true nature of the challenge.  It would be an overstate-
ment to say that the law of habeas corpus approaches the mind-bending com-
plexity of quantum mechanics.3  But habeas corpus has tied courts and legal
scholars into knots for many years.  One of the finest efforts to disentangle
it—and to grapple with the question how, if at all, habeas corpus should be
used for those whose detention flows from a criminal trial—is now fifty years
© 2020 Diane P. Wood.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the authors, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
1 Talk: Richard Feynman, WIKIQUOTE, https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Talk:Richard_
Feynman (last updated Oct. 7, 2019) (attributing the quote, in 2014, to a university lecture
called The Character of Physical Law).
2 Niels Bohr, WIKIQUOTE, https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Niels_Bohr (last updated
Feb. 11, 2020).  There is dispute surrounding the quote.  Karen Barad attributed this spe-
cific variant to Bohr in KAREN MICHELLE BARAD, MEETING THE UNIVERSE HALFWAY 254
(2007), with the quote attributed to NIELS BOHR, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF NIELS
BOHR (1987), although without any page number or volume number.
3 If you doubt that characterization of quantum mechanics, I invite you to read the
fascinating book by JOHN GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF SCHRO¨DINGER’S CAT: QUANTUM PHYSICS
AND REALITY (1984).  You will be convinced.
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old.  I am speaking of Judge Henry Friendly’s thoughtful article, published in
1970 in the University of Chicago Law Review, entitled Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments.4
Habeas corpus law has not remained static during the half century since
Judge Friendly wrote, but neither has it provided satisfactory answers to the
problems that he highlighted in his article.  Unfortunately, many of the
changes—well intended as they were by the enactors and implementers—
have done nothing but create endless hurdles, loops, and traps for potential
users.  Enormous resources are poured into this elusive remedy.  The rule of
law is not well served when people are told that they have a remedy, but in
fact they do not.  Far better to have truth-in-labeling, so that the cases that
deserve collateral review get it, and those that do not are more clearly identi-
fied from the outset and quickly dismissed.  This is the goal that Judge
Friendly set for himself in his article, but unfortunately it is not one that we
have yet attained.  Whether that is because of flaws in his suggestions, or fail-
ures to adopt them, is the subject of this Article.  The answer, I suggest, is a
little of both: some of his suggestions need further refinement, and others
simply need to be implemented more vigorously.  In the end, a remarkable
number of Judge Friendly’s observations still apply to today’s writ, and thus
many of his prescriptions remain well worth legislative attention.
I. BACKGROUND OF HABEAS CORPUS
The Latin phrase “habeas corpus” is written in the second-person pre-
sent subjunctive mood of the verb “habere,” which means “to have.”  “Habeas
corpus” thus does not mean “You have the body.”  That would be a present
indicative statement, merely descriptive of the current state of affairs.
Instead, it means something more like “You may have the body [if you can
justify your custody],” or “Should you have the body?”  Indeed, the use of the
subjunctive mood is doing all the work here: it is what drives the writ, which
for centuries has been understood to run to the custodian and to command
that custodian to justify the continued detention of the applicant.  Once the
person has been released from custody and all cognizable collateral conse-
quences of incarceration have ceased, the petitioner no longer has an active
controversy and the habeas corpus petition must be dismissed.5  Dismissal is
also required if the petitioner dies before the case is resolved.6
Following the lead of no less an authority than William Blackstone, it has
been fashionable to trace the old English writ of habeas corpus back to
Magna Carta itself.  In his Commentaries, he wrote that the writ of habeas
corpus ad subjiciendum is a writ of right, “established on the firmest basis by
the provisions of Magna Carta, and a long succession of statutes enacted
4 Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970).
5 See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998).
6 See, e.g., Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing cases).  At
least for mortal authorities, death releases a person from “custody.”
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under Edward III.”7  Later scholars have found this claim to be overblown,8
yet they agree that the writ is a very old one.  Codified in 1679 during the
reign of Charles II, the writ of habeas corpus crossed the Atlantic largely on
Blackstone’s back—his Commentaries on the Law of England were on every colo-
nial lawyer’s desk.  It was he who called the writ of habeas corpus ad sub-
jiciendum “the most celebrated writ in the English law.”9  And from there the
writ shows up in the U.S. Constitution, in Article I, Section 9, Clause 2—but
not, as commentators have pointed out, as an affirmative grant of power to
issue writs of habeas corpus.10  Instead, the Constitution does no more than
to protect against the suspension of the “Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus,” without defining what that writ might be, with exceptions allowing
suspension during times of rebellion or invasion.11
The state courts were entitled, then and now, to handle habeas corpus as
they wished.  But at the federal level it is Congress that has put meat on the
bones of the constitutional language.  And it has done so ever since the First
Judiciary Act, section 14 of which gave the federal courts the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus.12
II. PRISONER PETITIONS FROM 1867 TO 1996
It was not always obvious that the writ would be available to persons
whose custody resulted from judicial proceedings, as opposed to those who
were in some form of executive detention.  Put bluntly, the custodian of
someone in the former class has an easy answer to the question “why are you
detaining this individual”: the response is “because he or she was accused,
tried by a jury (or the court, or admitted guilt), and has been sentenced to
prison.”  This is quite different from the answer that the custodian of a per-
son the police simply grabbed from the street and threw in jail would give.
Supreme Court decisions such as Boumediene v. Bush13 and Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr14 illustrate the distinctive nature of the analysis
required for the latter group of cases.  This Article, like Judge Friendly’s,
however, is concerned solely with the first group—that is, convicted prisoners
7 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *133.
8 See, e.g., WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 45
(1980); Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 375,
377–78 (1998) (“Blackstone and Coke traced habeas corpus to the Magna Carta; however,
there is little relationship between Magna Carta and habeas corpus.  Perhaps the most that
can be said is that the writ Blackstone called the ‘glory of the English law’ arose from
‘humble and obscure origins in medieval England.’” (citations omitted) (quoting 2 BLACK-
STONE, supra note 7 at *133; Robert J. Sharpe, A Constitutional History of Habeas Corpus, PUB.
L., Spring 1982, at 154, 154 (book review))).
9 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *129.
10 See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 61–65 (2006).
11 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
12 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82.
13 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (enemy combatants).
14 533 U.S. 289, 292–93 (2001) (immigration).
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who seek to avail themselves of the writ of habeas corpus.  It was not until
1867 that the federal courts were empowered to grant relief to both state and
federal prisoners,15 and so this is a convenient starting point for a quick look
at the way in which habeas corpus has functioned.
The 1867 Act empowered all federal courts and their judges or Justices,
acting “within their respective jurisdictions,” to “grant writs of habeas corpus
in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in viola-
tion of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.”16  Ini-
tially, the 1867 statute did not trigger huge numbers of petitions; to the
contrary, as Lewis Mayers points out, that statute “repos[ed] almost quiescent
for decades,” only to be revealed as “a sleeping giant” in the 1950s and
1960s.17  Mayers argues that the habeas corpus statute was intended to pro-
tect the rights of citizens newly freed from slavery and that there is in fact “no
foundation for the [Supreme] Court’s assertions that the 1867 act was
intended to afford a new remedy for state prisoners.”18  Nonetheless, that is
the path that the statute ultimately took—a development that was impossible
to contradict by the mid-twentieth century.
In 1948, Congress undertook a comprehensive revision of the Judicial
Code.19  It endeavored, for the most part successfully, to make few substan-
tive changes to the law, and the habeas corpus provisions of the 1867 Act
were no exception.  The 1948 revision codified the provisions relating to the
writ for state prisoners in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and it formally added language
requiring that group of petitioners to exhaust their state remedies before
turning to federal court.20  The 1948 codifiers also took steps to relieve
courts from the unequal burden of petitions they were receiving from federal
prisoners—petitions that were heavily concentrated in districts that housed
federal prisons, given the requirement to seek the writ in the district of con-
finement.21  They did so by providing a substitute motion, 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
for federal prisoners who wished to challenge their convictions or sentences;
that motion had to be brought in the district of conviction.22
Although the procedural apparatus did not change much between 1867
and 1996, the same cannot be said of the cognizable grounds for relief.
15 See Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243 (2018)).
16 Id.
17 Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33
U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 31 (1965).
18 Id. at 55–56.
19 See Judicial Code Revisions Make Administrative Changes, FED. JUD. CTR., https://
www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/judicial-code-revisions-make-administrative-changes (last vis-
ited Apr. 13, 2020).
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2018).
21 See id. § 2241.
22 Id. § 2255(a).  In the rare case where the remedy provided by the motion under
§ 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective,” the statute provides that the prisoner may proceed
under the general habeas corpus statute, id. § 2241. See, e.g., Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d
1123, 1135–39 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)).
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Before 1867, the common wisdom was that a person confined pursuant to
judicial process—that is, a prisoner—could obtain habeas corpus relief only
if the court that rendered the judgment lacked jurisdiction to do so.23  That
rule was loosened in 1867, though by how much and for whom is debatable.
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that federal prisoners could now complain about
the convicting court’s jurisdiction, about the constitutionality of the statute
of conviction, and about the lawfulness of the sentence.  “Pure” constitu-
tional challenges, however, were rare.
The modern expansion of habeas corpus can be dated to two decisions
from the early twentieth century: Frank v. Mangum24 and Moore v. Dempsey.25
Both arose out of state court proceedings; both involved a total breakdown of
the criminal justice system; and both petitioners asserted that their due pro-
cess rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated.26  In Frank,
the Court nonetheless refused to issue the writ.27  In Moore, it reversed course
and did so.28 Moore thus laid the doctrinal basis for broader federal power to
overturn the results of a state court proceeding.  But, perhaps because of the
extreme facts of the case, or perhaps because the law changes slowly, it was
some time before courts began to exercise that power.
It was the case of Brown v. Allen,29 which involved the case of an African
American defendant who had been tried for murder and sentenced to death
before a jury that had been selected in a racially discriminatory way, that
marked the beginning of an era of robust federal court action.  The state
courts, from the trial court through the court of last resort (and a denial of
certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court) had rejected Brown’s petition.30  At
that point, Brown filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
district court.31  At the Supreme Court, satisfied that Brown had properly
exhausted his state court remedies, the Justices grappled with the question
whether a federal court was entitled to revisit the decisions of state courts on
federal constitutional claims.  The Court rejected the argument that the state
courts’ decisions represented the final word, but it also refused to hold that
review under § 2254 was plenary.  Instead, the Court attempted to follow a
middle road, in which the district court would determine whether additional
proceedings were necessary, and exercise its discretion to order them only if
the record failed to show that “the state process has given fair consideration
to the issues and the offered evidence, and has resulted in a satisfactory
conclusion.”32
23 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 207 (1830).
24 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
25 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
26 See id. at 87; Frank, 237 U.S. at 324–26.
27 Frank, 237 U.S. at 345.
28 Moore, 261 U.S. at 92.
29 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
30 Id. at 459, 466–67.
31 Id. at 447.
32 Id. at 463–64.
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Other Justices in Brown were not satisfied with the majority’s guidance to
the lower courts on how to balance the interest in finality of the state court
results and the federal habeas corpus remedy.  Two in particular emphasized
the low success rate enjoyed by prisoners who file petitions for the writ.33
Justice Robert Jackson, concurring in the result, had this to say:
Controversy as to the undiscriminating use of the writ of habeas corpus
by federal judges to set aside state court convictions is traceable to three
principal causes: (1) this Court’s use of the generality of the Fourteenth
Amendment to subject state courts to increasing federal control, especially
in the criminal law field; (2) ad hoc determination of due process of law
issues by personal notions of justice instead of by known rules of law; and (3)
the breakdown of procedural safeguards against abuse of the writ.34
We will return to these concerns, since they lie behind many of Judge
Friendly’s observations as well.  For now, however, we can contrast them to
Justice Frankfurter’s observations in his separate Brown opinion:
Experience may be summoned to support the belief that most claims in
these attempts to obtain review of State convictions are without merit.  Pre-
sumably they are adequately dealt with in the State courts. . . . The meritori-
ous claims are few, but our procedures must ensure that those few claims are
not stifled by undiscriminating generalities.  The complexities of our feder-
alism and the workings of a scheme of government involving the interplay of
two governments, one of which is subject to limitations enforceable by the
other, are not to be escaped by simple, rigid rules which, by avoiding some
abuses, generate others.
For surely it is an abuse to deal too casually and too lightly with rights
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, even though they involve limitations
upon State power and may be invoked by those morally unworthy.  Under
the guise of fashioning a procedural rule, we are not justified in wiping out
the practical efficacy of a jurisdiction conferred by Congress on the District
Courts.  Rules which in effect treat all these cases indiscriminately as frivo-
lous do not fall far short of abolishing this head of jurisdiction.35
Justice Frankfurter then proposed procedures (the details of which do not
matter for present purposes) for the district courts to follow.36  In the final
analysis, Brown came to be understood as a holding supporting the power of
the federal courts to relitigate questions of federal constitutional law in a
33 See id. at 498 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), 537 (Jackson, J., concurring).
34 Id. at 532 (Jackson, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 497–99 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
36 Id. at 502–08.  Frankfurter recommended the following six steps: (1) the petitioner
must make out a prima facie case for relief; (2) failure to exhaust is “an obvious ground for
denying the application”; (3) the district courts should have discretion in deciding whether
to call for the state record or to hold their own evidentiary hearing; (4) when the district
court has the state court record, it may defer to the state’s finding of fact (especially histori-
cal fact), but state conclusions of law cannot be accepted as binding; (5) the district court
should make its own decision on both pure questions of law and mixed questions of law
and fact; and (6) the judge may “take into consideration” the fact of a prior denial of relief
on the same claim. Id.
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habeas corpus case, even if those questions had been fully and fairly venti-
lated in the state court.
Brown’s procedural green light was followed a decade later with a
Supreme Court decision that further lightened the procedural burdens for
habeas corpus petitioners.  This was Fay v. Noia.37  The underlying question
concerned the ability of the petitioner to raise a claim that he had been con-
victed on the basis of a coerced confession—indeed, as Justice Brennan put it
for the majority, a “conviction now admitted by the State to rest upon a con-
fession obtained from him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”38
Petitioner Noia had failed to seek appellate review in the state courts, and on
that basis the state courts also denied his state postconviction petition for
relief.  The federal district court rejected his § 2254 petition on the ground
that he had failed to exhaust his state remedies, but the Second Circuit
reversed.39  The Supreme Court agreed that his case could go forward.  Its
holding is at such odds with today’s habeas corpus law that it is worth setting
out in full:
We hold: (1) Federal courts have power under the federal habeas statute to
grant relief despite the applicant’s failure to have pursued a state remedy
not available to him at the time he applies; the doctrine under which state
procedural defaults are held to constitute an adequate and independent
state law ground barring direct Supreme Court review is not to be extended
to limit the power granted the federal courts under the federal habeas stat-
ute.  (2) Noia’s failure to appeal was not a failure to exhaust “the remedies
available in the courts of the State” as required by § 2254; that requirement
refers only to a failure to exhaust state remedies still open to the applicant at
the time he files his application for habeas corpus in the federal court.  (3)
Noia’s failure to appeal cannot under the circumstances be deemed an intel-
ligent and understanding waiver of his right to appeal such as to justify the
withholding of federal habeas corpus relief.40
At least with the benefit of hindsight, it is not surprising that Noia’s half-life
was as short as it was.  The combination of decisions in Brown and Noia, how-
ever, was the inspiration for Judge Friendly’s 1970 article, and so it is useful
to recall exactly what they said.
Needless to say, Judge Friendly was not the only person who thought
that federal habeas corpus law had gone too far (though there were certainly
defenders of its scope as well).  Concerned about the efficiency, finality, and
comity implications of such a broad scope for federal habeas corpus actions,
the Supreme Court began to regroup in the early 1970s.  The first sign of this
trend came in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,41 where the question was whether a
defendant could win issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by showing that he
was not aware of his right to withhold consent to a search, or if instead the
37 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
38 Id. at 394.
39 Id. at 396–97.
40 Id. at 398–99 (emphasis omitted).
41 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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state was entitled to justify the search for Fourth Amendment purposes by the
totality of the circumstances.  The Court opted for the latter rule, which was
the one the state court had used.42  Three years later, in Stone v. Powell43 it
closed the door altogether to habeas corpus relief based on a violation of the
Fourth Amendment in any case where a state had offered a full and fair
opportunity to air the claim.  People wondered, after Powell, whether the
Court was planning to rein in habeas corpus one topic at a time, but that did
not happen.
Instead, in 1977, Wainwright v. Sykes44 heralded the virtual overruling of
Fay v. Noia and the adoption of a rule far more deferential to state court
proceedings.  The Court held that a federal constitutional challenge could
not be entertained if the state court ruling was based on an adequate and
independent rule of state law—there, the state’s contemporaneous-objection
rule.45  At the same time the Court rejected Noia’s deliberate-bypass stan-
dard.46  It also reemphasized the importance of exhausting state court reme-
dies,47 even while acknowledging, consistently with Francis v. Henderson,48
that certain procedural defaults can be overcome if the petitioner can show
cause and prejudice.49
Much more could be said about these developments.  During this
period, there was, for instance, a well-developed concept of “abuse of the
writ,”50 which “defin[ed] the circumstances in which federal courts
decline[d] to entertain a claim presented for the first time in a second or
subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”51  Buried within the exhaus-
tion requirement is the rule that the federal claim must be “fairly presented
to the state court[ ].”52  But we can save our consideration of the procedural
complexity of this area for later, because the modern picture has been pro-
foundly affected both by statutory change and Supreme Court decisions.
What was happening to the habeas corpus caseloads during these years?
In a word, they were booming.  In 1953, when Brown v. Allen was handed
down, the federal courts handled 541 petitions.53  As of 1960, state prisoner
habeas corpus petitions numbered 871, or 2.27% of private civil cases in the
federal courts.54  By 1970, the year in which Judge Friendly published his
42 See id. at 248–49.
43 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
44 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
45 Id. at 81.
46 Id. at 85–86.
47 Id. at 80.
48 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
49 Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87.
50 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991).
51 Id.
52 Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 367 (1995) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)).
53 Friendly, supra note 4, at 143.
54 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1270 (7th ed. 2015) (table setting forth number of petitions filed).
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article, the number had increased tenfold, to 9063 for the year.55  The 1980
numbers slipped back a bit, to 7031, but by 1990 it had jumped back to
10,823; in 2000 it was 21,349; and in 2010 it was 17,042.56  For the year end-
ing September 30, 2019, the number (down slightly from some recent years)
was 16,902.57  It is hard to resist the conclusion that through thick and thin,
reform and inaction, the number relentlessly goes up.  And the numbers
since 1996 are the ones affected by Congress’s most serious effort yet to rein
in habeas corpus petitions from state and federal prisoners: the 1996 Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,58 known to all as AEDPA.  Before
turning to a close examination of Judge Friendly’s 1970 proposals, we will
finish up this quick tour of habeas corpus law with a look at that statute.
III. THE AEDPA REGIME
Concern had been growing for years with the burgeoning number of
petitions filed by prisoners—people who all had been tried in either a state
or a federal trial court, and who had all had the opportunity to pursue appel-
late review in the proper court system.  There was also a widespread percep-
tion that the overwhelming number of petitions were meritless, that prisoner
petitions were tying up federal courts with pointless work, that the federal
habeas corpus regime was unjustifiably relegating the state courts to second-
class status, that it stripped state court judgments of their finality, and that it
perversely encouraged prisoners not to take their sentences seriously.  This
prompted Congress to step in with legislation designed to realign incentives
and to reassert society’s interest in the finality of judgments.  AEDPA was the
result, and in particular, the provisions of AEDPA that amended the habeas
corpus statute used by state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the statute used
by federal prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Whatever else one may say about AEDPA, there is no doubt that it
effected major changes in federal habeas corpus.  Among the most important
of those changes were the following:
• It clarified and tightened the standard that the district courts were to
use in evaluating a petition.
• It introduced a new exhaustion standard:
° The applicant had to exhaust state remedies unless none was
available.
° It allowed the district court to overlook waivers of the exhaustion
requirement by the State.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES COM-
MENCED, BY NATURE OF SUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2015
THROUGH 2019, TABLE C-2A, at 2 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data_tables/jb_c2a_0930.2019.pdf.
58 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
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° It demanded the use of “any available procedure” under state law
through which a point might be raised.
• It greatly strengthened the deference owed to state court conclusions
of law, with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in the
state court, and its new substantive standard ruled out reliance on
lower federal court decisions:
° First, was the state court’s decision “contrary to . . . clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States”;
° Or second, was the state court’s decision “an unreasonable appli-
cation of” that same law, clearly established by the Supreme
Court?
• Deference to facts found by the state courts was also heightened.
The federal court, according to § 2254(d)(2), was first to evaluate the
case using the facts that were before the state court, asking whether
the result “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts”
based on that record.
• Only in rare cases may the federal court go beyond the state factual
record and hold its own evidentiary hearing pursuant to § 2254(e).
° One such situation arises if the claim rests on “a new rule of con-
stitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable”;
° Another required both “a factual predicate that could not have
been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence”
and facts that “would be sufficient to establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.”
• The regime for second or successive petitions also changed.  They
had been discouraged through the “abuse of the writ” doctrine, but
AEPDA introduced a requirement of prescreening by the court of
appeals before such a petition could even be filed, and stringent lim-
its on permissions.
The constitutionality of these changes has been upheld by the Supreme
Court, and so any discussion of them is one about statutes and policy.  In
Felker v. Turpin,59 the Supreme Court held that the AEDPA regime did not
amount to an impermissible suspension of the writ.  It reasoned that an origi-
nal writ of habeas corpus may still be sought in the Supreme Court;60 the
statute does not repeal the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in viola-
tion of the Exceptions Clause of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution;61
and (again focusing on a possible writ in the Supreme Court itself) there is
no problem with AEDPA’s standards for granting relief, because they apply
59 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
60 Id. at 658.
61 Id. at 661–62.
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only to applications filed in the district courts.62  Having acknowledged all
that, the Court rejected the petition before it in Felker, finding nothing so
extraordinary about it that it justified such an unusual step.63
Finally, as noted above, AEDPA singles out “new rules” of constitutional
law in several places.  The Supreme Court had already addressed what should
be considered a new rule, and when such a rule may constitutionally be
applied retroactively, in Teague v. Lane.64 Teague’s teachings on retroactivity
are not outdated,65 as the Court confirmed in Greene v. Fisher66 that the
AEDPA and Teague inquiries are separate.  New procedural rules, including
constitutional rules of criminal procedure, normally do not apply to cases
that have finished a full round of direct review, including discretionary
review before the court of last resort.67  But exceptions exist if (1) the rule
affects some constitutionally protected interest; (2) the rule affects funda-
mental fairness (a very small set involving so-called structural errors, such as a
total failure to provide counsel, a biased trial judge, racial discrimination in
the selection of a grand jury, the denial of self-representation at trial, or a
defective reasonable-doubt instruction);68 or (3) the new rule affects sub-
stance, not procedure.69
With this quick tour of the habeas corpus horizon, we are ready to
return to Judge Friendly’s article, see what he recommended, see what has
happened, and ask whether the system could still stand to be improved.
IV. FRIENDLY: IS INNOCENCE IRRELEVANT?
The question is a provocative one.  Ingrained in the American system of
justice and our notion of the rule of law is the norm that an innocent person
should not be punished or sent to prison.  We go to great lengths in the
service of that norm: the use of the probable-cause standard for accusations,
the assurance of counsel for every person who wants it, and above all, the
assurance that a person cannot be convicted unless the trier of fact finds guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.  We could ask Judge Friendly’s question in two
ways: one might wonder why we would consider setting all of that to one side
for collateral relief; or one might say that, having done our best, there is a
time to be finished, even if a few residual errors remain behind.
62 Id. at 662.
63 Id. at 664–65.
64 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
65 See, e.g., Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1198–1201 (11th Cir. 2008); Daniels v.
United States, 254 F.3d 1180, 1196 (10th Cir. 2001).
66 565 U.S. 34, 39 (2011) (“We have explained that AEDPA did not codify Teague, and
that ‘the AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct.’”  (quoting Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266,
272 (2002) (per curiam))).
67 See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999).
68 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).
69 See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016); Bousley v. United States,
523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).
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Judge Friendly’s article proceeds from the second of those perspectives.
He begins with this observation:
After trial, conviction, sentence, appeal, affirmance, and denial of certiorari
by the Supreme Court, in proceedings where the defendant had the assis-
tance of counsel at every step, the criminal process, in Winston Churchill’s
phrase, has not reached the end, or even the beginning of the end, but only
the end of the beginning.70
Put that way, it is hard to imagine who would want such a system.
But the people who specialize in ferreting out wrongful convictions,
both in capital cases and in other serious felony matters, have an answer.
The New England Innocence Project reports that since 1989, there have
been 2471 exonerations in the United States.71  It lists the most common
contributing factors: mistaken identification; false confessions; forensic sci-
ence problems; perjury or false accusations; and official misconduct.  The
Brennan Center for Justice adds to the list prosecutorial misconduct, the
strained resources and crushing caseloads of public defense attorneys, and
the willingness of some people to plead guilty just to get out of jail.72  Most
troublesome for present purposes is the length of time an exoneration takes.
The Northern California Innocence Project (NCIP) notes that the National
Registry of Exonerations estimates that the average exoneration occurs
nearly eleven years after the conviction, and that its own data are compara-
ble.73  Critically, the NCIP states that its “clients have all been in prison long
enough to have completed their appeals and been denied relief, which typi-
cally takes three years or more.  Many of them have pursued one or more
habeas corpus petitions on their own before learning of the existence of
NCIP.”74  In other words, relief almost always comes as a result of postconvic-
tion, collateral proceedings.  So this is not as one-sided an inquiry as Judge
Friendly’s eloquent account might make it appear to be.
It is also true, however, that the number of exonerated people pales in
comparison to the number of people each year who are convicted of felonies,
and to the overall number of people in prison after conviction of a felony.75
Moreover, success rates on collateral review have always been very low.76  And
70 Friendly, supra note 4, at 142.
71 Causes of Wrongful Convictions, NEW ENG. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://
www.newenglandinnocence.org/causes-of-wrongful-convictions (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
72 See Ames Grawert, Wrongful Convictions, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/wrongful-convictions.
73 Maitreya Badami, Why Do Exonerations Take So Long?, SANTA CLARA U. SCH. L. (Nov.
7, 2016), https://law.scu.edu/northern-california-innocence-project/why-do-exonerations-
take-so-long/.
74 Id.
75 The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that the prison population, both state and
federal, was 1,489,363 at the end of 2017. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2017, at 3 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf.
Federal and state authorities admitted 418,000 new prisoners in 2017. Id. at 12.
76 A 2007 study examined a sample of noncapital habeas cases filed in the district
courts between 2003 and 2004, and a 2012 follow-on study examined the disposition of the
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the ground of a petition mattered.  At the time Judge Friendly was writing, it
was accurate to say that “the one thing almost never suggested on collateral
attack is that the prisoner was innocent of the crime.”77  Against that back-
drop, he posited that for a number of reasons, “collateral attack on criminal
convictions carries a serious burden of justification.”78
Those reasons include the following: first, collateral attack undermines
the educational and deterrent functions of criminal law;79 second, collateral
attack could occur at any point during the period of custody, and long delays
undermine the reliability of fact finding;80 third, the “drain upon the
resources of the community—judges, prosecutors, and attorneys appointed
to aid the accused, and even of that oft overlooked necessity, courtrooms”;81
fourth, the small number of meritorious petitions can get lost in the sea of
frivolous ones;82 and finally, the undermining of public respect for criminal
judgments that occurs when the judgment is always vulnerable to second-
guessing.83  These weighty concerns, Judge Friendly urged, should receive
some consideration in the law of collateral attack, even though on the other
side of the balance one finds the life, liberty, and constitutional rights of the
petitioner.  In that connection, he draws the following distinction:
A statement like that just quoted [acknowledging those interests], entirely
sound with respect to a man who is or may be innocent, is readily metamor-
phosed into broader ones . . . expansive enough to cover a man steeped in
guilt who attacks his conviction years later because of some technical error
by the police that was or could have been considered at his trial.84
With these concerns in mind, and cognizant of the small percentage of
habeas corpus petitions that were granted as of the time he wrote,85 he pro-
same set of cases on appeal.  Nancy J. King, Non-Capital Habeas Cases After Appellate Review:
An Empirical Analysis, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 308 (2012).  Of the sample cases, the district
courts initially granted habeas in only 0.64% of cases.  In 4.7% of cases, the prisoner was
granted a certificate of appealability.  In 0.7% of all cases, the courts of appeals remanded
the district court’s denial of habeas, and in 0.28% of cases, the district court granted relief
after remand.  Additionally, the courts of appeals reversed a district court’s grant of habeas
in 0.01% of cases.  Thus, in the final analysis, the federal courts granted habeas in noncapi-
tal cases in only 0.82% of federal cases.
77 Friendly, supra note 4, at 145.
78 Id. at 146.
79 Id. (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 (1963)).
80 Id. at 146–47.
81 Id. at 148.
82 Id. at 149.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 150.
85 The success rates of habeas petitions have been persistently low.  One study of
habeas petitions filed from 1975 through 1977 found that the petition was granted in 3.2%
of cases, and the prisoner was ultimately released in 1.8% of total cases. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE PRISONER PETITIONS 5 (1984),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hc-frspp.pdf.  This rate is only modestly higher
than the 0.82% grant rate shown by more recent studies. See supra note 76.
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posed a number of reforms for collateral relief—reforms that he thought
suitable both for intrasystem petitions (that is, the motion under § 2255 for
federal prisoners) and intersystem petitions (that is, the petition under
§ 2254 for state prisoners).
As the title to the article suggests, the overarching change that Judge
Friendly believed was necessary focused on innocence: he wanted “a require-
ment that, with certain exceptions, an applicant for habeas corpus must
make a colorable showing of innocence” in his petition.86  Such a rule, he
thought, “would enable courts of first instance to screen out rather rapidly a
great multitude of applications not deserving their attention,”87 thereby ena-
bling them to devote their resources to the few cases in which an injustice
may have been done.88  He preferred this system to one in which the writ for
prisoners was abolished entirely (on the assumption that this would not clash
with the Suspension Clause) in favor of exclusive reliance on executive
clemency.89
But he was not prepared to limit the writ exclusively to cases of actual
innocence.  There were other areas in which he was willing to allow use of
the writ even without any underlying innocence claim.  The first one that he
indicates is worthy of continuing support is the situation in which “the crimi-
nal process itself has broken down; the defendant has not had the kind of
trial the Constitution guarantees.”90  Under that rubric, he placed the classic
cases in which the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, or the statute supporting the
prosecution was unconstitutional, or the sentence could not lawfully be
imposed.91  Racial discrimination in jury selection,92 jury tampering,93 exces-
sive publicity,94 and lack of counsel during a critical phase95 also fell within
this category.
The second general area in which Judge Friendly thought collateral
attack to be “readily justified” regardless of actual innocence occurs “where a
denial of constitutional rights is claimed on the basis of facts which ‘are
dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was not open to considera-
tion and review on appeal.’”96  He gave three examples of this: convictions
on pleas of guilty obtained by improper means; convictions procured by the
86 Friendly, supra note 4, at 150.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 151.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
93 See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
94 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965).
95 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
96 Friendly, supra note 4, at 152 (quoting Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942)
(per curiam)).
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prosecution’s knowing use of perjured testimony; and convictions of a person
who was incompetent to stand trial.97
Third, he was open to habeas corpus that did not include an innocence
claim in situations where the law applicable to the trial did not afford any
opportunity for the defendant to raise a constitutional defense at trial or on
appeal.98  Fourth and finally, Judge Friendly was willing to permit petitions
resting on new developments in constitutional criminal procedure, if those
developments were fundamental enough to be fully retroactive, even if there
was no innocence claim.99  Not all are, he hastened to add, noting as exam-
ples the extension of the exclusionary rule to the states, the prohibition
against comment on a defendant’s silence, the right to a jury trial in state
criminal cases, and several others.100
In summary, Judge Friendly attempted to distinguish between ordinary
errors, regrettable and inevitable as they may be, and the foundational error
of convicting one who is actually innocent, and the four categories that he
identified as otherwise appropriate for collateral attack.  This would exclude
many constitutional claims from habeas corpus, he believed—a result that he
defended on the ground that such a defendant has already received the
structural protections guaranteed by the Constitution.101
V. HABEAS CORPUS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
It is interesting to ask, fifty years later, how well Judge Friendly’s sugges-
tions have stood the test of time.  We can begin with the four categories for
which he did not insist on an actual innocence claim and ask what has hap-
pened to them, and whether he struck the right balance.  We then must take
a procedural interlude, because many of AEDPA’s most important innova-
tions were procedural, and no one doubts that procedure can have just as
much an effect as substance on the availability of the writ.  Finally, we turn to
the vexing problem of actual innocence.  These inquiries afford the opportu-
nity both to evaluate Judge Friendly’s suggestions and to consider whether we
have struck the correct balance today, under the AEDPA regime.  Too gener-
ous?  Too stingy?  Are the distinctions he was trying to draw between these
areas and other rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments sound ones?
A. Criminal Process Breakdown
The Supreme Court has long recognized that certain criteria are essen-
tial for a fair trial, and that when they are missing, the defendant is entitled
to a redo.  We can take some guidance on this point from the closely related
97 Id.
98 Id. at 152–53 (citing as an example Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)).
99 Id. at 153.
100 Id. at 153–54.
101 See id. at 157.
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decision in Neder v. United States,102 where the Court distinguished between
ordinary constitutional violations, which are subject to harmless-error review,
and more fundamental violations, which are not:
The error at issue here—a jury instruction that omits an element of the
offense—differs markedly from the constitutional violations we have found
to defy harmless-error review.  Those cases, we have explained, contain a
“defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than
simply an error in the trial process itself.”  Such errors “infect the entire trial
process,” and “necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair.”  Put another
way, these errors deprive defendants of “basic protections” without which “a
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination
of guilt or innocence . . . and no criminal punishment may be regarded as
fundamentally fair.”103
Stressing that the list was a short one, the Court singled out the complete
denial of counsel, a biased trial judge, racial discrimination in the selection
of a grand jury, the denial of self-representation at trial, the denial of a public
trial, and a defective reasonable-doubt instruction as structural errors it had
recognized.104  While an erroneous jury instruction is certainly an error, it is
the type of error that must be raised at the right time and place, and harm-
less-error analysis applies.
Under the modern, precise understanding of what a “jurisdictional”
defect is (and is not),105 these structural or framework defects would not be
enough to establish a lack of jurisdiction in the court.  Yet they do involve
foundational constitutional problems that go to the heart of the judicial sys-
tem, albeit they are procedural problems rather than problems that go to the
constitutionality of the statute of prosecution or the lawfulness of the sen-
tence.  The judicial system as a whole has a strong interest in preventing, or
redressing, this type of framework problem.  Because the integrity of the
criminal process itself is at stake, a petitioner should be able to raise one of
these defects without also making a prima facie showing of actual innocence.
When and how the petitioner does this is another matter, which depends on
the procedural rules that must be followed.  But I agree with Judge Friendly
that the writ of habeas corpus should be available for someone who asserts
this type of claim.
B. Facts Outside the Record
Some precision is necessary when we turn to this ground.  Judge
Friendly was not inviting reconsideration of every criminal conviction in
which the defendant located additional facts after his conviction (including
102 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
103 Id. at 8–9 (omission in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Arizona v. Fulmi-
nante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); then quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630
(1993); and then quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986)).
104 Id. at 8.
105 See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 625 (2002) (indictment defects do not
deprive a court of its power to adjudicate the case).
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direct appeals) was over.  Nor do I support such a sweeping rule; I have seen
too many cases in which a key witness recants, or additional alibi evidence
turns up, or a new witness is located.  Often the new information is cumula-
tive, or the defendant (and her lawyer) failed to exercise due diligence when
the case was first being handled.  (This includes during the period when a
defendant may be considering a plea of guilty—an important qualification
because so many criminal prosecutions are resolved that way.)106
As I understand Judge Friendly, he would limit this ground to facts that
were utterly beyond the reach of the defendant at the first-instance stage.
His examples illustrate the point: “convictions on pleas of guilty obtained by
improper means, or on evidence known to the prosecution to be perjured, or
where it later appears that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial.”107
The most diligent defense lawyer in the country has no way of knowing that a
guilty plea was coerced if the prosecutor has threatened the defendant not to
reveal those methods and is not candid with defense counsel.  Nor is counsel
likely to know if the prosecutor is knowingly using perjured testimony.
Incompetence to stand trial is a more difficult ground, since the trial court
and defense counsel have an obligation to explore that possibility at the out-
set, if they can see signs of incompetence.  But there are some cases in which
the key information does not come to light until long after trial.108  If, and
only if, there was no way to raise the point earlier, it should be cognizable in
habeas corpus.
C. Lack of Legal Opportunity to Raise an Argument
It is hard to think of examples that would fit within this category, other
than the one Judge Friendly used, Jackson v. Denno.109  There the Supreme
Court ordered the grant of a writ of habeas corpus for petitioner Jackson,
because the New York state courts had failed to give him a proper and timely
opportunity to challenge the voluntariness of the confession on which his
conviction rested.  Instead, after making a preliminary determination, in
which the only question was whether the confession was so obviously involun-
tary that it should be excluded, the New York courts left to the jury the ulti-
mate determination of voluntariness.  And worse, the jury’s finding was
subsumed in its general verdict, making it impossible to know “whether the
jury found the confession voluntary and relied upon it, or involuntary and
106 In 2018, approximately 90% of federal criminal cases ended with a guilty plea, while
8% of cases were dismissed.  Only 2% of federal criminal cases proceeded to trial.  John
Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who Do Are Found
Guilty, PEW RES. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/
11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/.
107 Friendly, supra note 4, at 152 (citations omitted).
108 Something similar was alleged in Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1132 (7th Cir.
2015).  It was not until long after the trial and direct appeal that evidence indicating that
Webster had been intellectually disabled since his high school years surfaced, and thus that
this claim was not recently fabricated for the criminal case.
109 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-5\NDL501.txt unknown Seq: 18  5-JUN-20 12:42
1826 notre dame law review [vol. 95:5
supposedly ignored it.”110  The Supreme Court saw this as a failure on New
York’s part to give a defendant a timely opportunity to raise an issue of consti-
tutional dimension—the voluntariness of a confession—and so it ordered
New York at a minimum to give Jackson a new hearing on voluntariness.111
In the unlikely event that a state’s criminal procedures left a comparable
lacuna somewhere, we would still need to consider whether the defendant
had the obligation to make her objection in the state court (however futile
that might seem), take the objection up on appeal and present the constitu-
tional issue to the state’s highest court and in a petition for certiorari, and
only then turn to habeas corpus.  Litigants often preserve issues for higher
court review, and it is not clear to me that this procedure would be inade-
quate.  I thus am not persuaded that this group of cases deserves special con-
sideration, as long as it is still possible to overcome a procedural default
through the normal rules.
D. Retroactive Changes to Constitutional Criminal Procedure
Much ink has been spilled about retroactivity doctrine in the field of
constitutional criminal procedure.  Here we are not speaking about the
applicability of a new constitutional rule to a case that is still on direct review;
our concern is only with cases that have run the gamut of direct review and
are now on collateral review in federal court.  The leading decision for that
group of cases continues to be Teague v. Lane,112 despite the fact that AEDPA
has something to say on the point as well. Teague was a splintered decision,
in which Justice O’Connor wrote for the Court only in Parts I, II, and III.
Members of the Court disagreed over the proper rule for retroactivity for
cases on collateral review.
Justice O’Connor asked first whether the case being considered for ret-
roactive application announced a “new rule.”113  She defined a “new rule” as
one that “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or
the Federal Government.”114  “[A] case announces a new rule,” she said, “if
the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s
conviction became final.”115  She concluded that “[u]nless [a case on collat-
eral review] fall[s] within an exception to the general rule, new constitu-
tional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which
have become final before the new rules are announced.”116  At this juncture,
it is fair to say that Justice O’Connor’s views have withstood the test of time.
Thus, in Chaidez v. United States,117 the Court, over only two dissents, held
that the rule requiring criminal defense attorneys to inform noncitizen cli-
110 Id. at 379.
111 Id. at 395.
112 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
113 Id. at 299–300 (plurality opinion).
114 Id. at 301.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 310.
117 568 U.S. 342 (2013).
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ents of the risks of deportation arising from guilty pleas was a “new rule” and
thus not applicable on collateral review.118  In so holding, the Chaidez Court
applied Justice O’Connor’s Teague analysis.
Although these developments were far in the future when Judge
Friendly wrote, his discussion is consistent with Teague, under which a “new
rule” will not be applied on collateral attack, but applications of old rules will
be.  When the Supreme Court itself announces that a holding will apply to
cases on collateral review, that resolves the issue for all courts.
VI. PROCEDURES GOVERNING HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
AEDPA made important changes to the procedures used in petitions
under Sections 2254 and 2255.  This is not the place for a full treatment of all
of them.  I will touch only on the high points, insofar as they either facilitate
or impede the goals for habeas corpus that Judge Friendly outlined.  Key
procedural features include the following:
• The petitioner gets only one bite at the apple absent extraordinary
circumstances.119
• There are now stringent rules for second or successive petitions,
including the ban on any such petition that has not been authorized
by the court of appeals.  There are also strict standards for the appel-
late judges to use in assessing these applications.120
• AEDPA imposes a one-year limitations period for state prisoners fil-
ing applications for a writ of habeas corpus, roughly measured from
the date when the state courts finish with the case (with periods of
inaction within the state court system counting toward the one
year).121
• It also imposes a comparable one-year limitations period for federal
prisoners filing a motion under § 2255.122
• There is no appeal of right from a district court’s decision on a peti-
tion under § 2254 or a motion under § 2255; instead, either the dis-
trict court or a judge of the court of appeals must issue a certificate of
appealability, and such a certificate “may issue . . . only if the appli-
cant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.”123
In the aggregate, these rules block some of the petitions that Judge Friendly
would have been allowed.  The problem, mentioned earlier, of obtaining evi-
dence of actual innocence—his primary concern—is severe, and the data
indicate that it takes much longer than the one-year period given by the stat-
ute.  It is also extremely hard to justify the introduction of new facts, once the
118 Id. at 353.
119 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (2018).
120 Id. §§ 2244(b), 2255(h).
121 Id. § 2244(d).
122 Id. § 2255(f).
123 Id. § 2253(c)(2).
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record is complete in state court.124  This is not to say that the problem of
repetitive filings is illusory—far from it.  But it is troubling to solve it in a way
that shuts the door on potentially meritorious petitions, whether based on
actual innocence, or on one of the other grounds indicating a breakdown in
the criminal system or a fundamental failure of justice.
One might respond that executive clemency exists to catch that last
group of cases, but the statistics about clemency are grim.  The Department
of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney keeps clemency statistics going
back to President McKinley.125  In 1970, when President Nixon was in office,
1034 petitions for pardon and 242 petitions for clemency were pending; the
President granted 82 pardons and 14 clemency petitions.126  In 1980, Presi-
dent Carter had 477 pardon and 140 clemency petitions pending; he granted
155 pardons, 8 requests for clemency, and 3 remissions.127  President George
H.W. Bush in 1990 did not grant any petitions of any kind, despite the fact
that there were 432 petitions for pardon and 184 for clemency pending
before him.128  President Clinton’s record was no better: out of 693 petitions
for pardon and 1179 for clemency pending before him in 2000, he granted
70 pardons and 6 requests for clemency.129  President Obama granted none
in 2010, even though he had 1140 pardon petitions and 1869 clemency peti-
tions pending that year.130  President Trump is on course to grant a very low
number of requests; during his entire presidency so far, he has granted 18
petitions for pardon and 6 for clemency.131
Another response is that in Holland v. Florida,132 the Supreme Court has
recognized a narrow path for equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limita-
tions.  In so doing, it rejected the unduly rigid standard that the court of
appeals had used, under which a late filing by an attorney could be excused
only if the petitioner showed “proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty,
mental impairment,” or the like.133  Next, the Court ruled that the existence
of a nonjurisdictional limitations period in the statute supported a rebuttable
presumption in favor of equitable tolling, particularly in light of the equita-
ble principles that govern habeas corpus.134  It found nothing in the statu-
tory language that undermined this approach, even while it recognized that
the statute spells out some exceptions to the one-year rule.  The burden lies
124 See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 208–09 (2011).
125 See Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-
statistics (last updated Apr. 7, 2020).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 560 U.S. 631 (2010).
133 Id. at 634 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam), rev’d, 560 U.S. 631 (2010)).
134 Id. at 645–46.
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on the petitioner to show that he is entitled to equitable tolling.135  In order
to meet that burden, he must show “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’
and prevented timely filing.”136
Perhaps the Holland rule gives enough room for the rare case in which
the one-year statute unjustly prevents a claim from going forward.  But in the
class of cases that most prominently inspired Judge Friendly’s article—those
in which there is a claim of innocence—more may be needed.  With that
thought in mind, we turn finally to the plight of the wrongfully convicted,
innocent person.
VII. HABEAS CORPUS AND ACTUAL INNOCENCE
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to recognize innocence as a
stand-alone ground for granting a writ of habeas corpus, whether under Sec-
tion 2254, 2255, or 2241, but it has never flatly ruled out the possibility
either.  What the Court did feel comfortable saying, no later than its decision
in Stone v. Powell,137 was that a claim such as a Fourth Amendment complaint
about a search or seizure should be excluded from collateral review (unless
there was no fair opportunity to raise it in the first-instance courts), because
such a claim has little bearing on guilt or innocence.  Later, in Jackson v.
Virginia,138 the Court on collateral review held that it was proper to review
whether the evidence at trial was enough to demonstrate guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.  Unlike the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment directly implicates the ultimate issue of guilt or
innocence.
In Herrera v. Collins,139 the Court tiptoed up to the issue of a freestand-
ing claim of innocence.  Prior to that time, it had been willing to forgive
procedural defaults if the petitioner made a credible showing of innocence,
but this was just a “gateway” device to permit the court to address whatever
constitutional procedural violation had allegedly occurred.  The Court’s con-
sideration of petitioner Herrera’s claim gave great weight to the fact that
Herrera’s claim of innocence rested not on evidence from the trial, but
instead on evidence that had later come into his hands.140  By that time, the
Court said, the presumption of innocence with which every accused person
begins had long since been overcome, because a jury found him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The question was whether there was any way in
which Herrera could present his new evidence to a federal court; the state
courts were closed to him.
The Supreme Court was skeptical, at best.  It wrote:
135 Id. at 649.
136 Id. (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
137 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
138 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
139 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
140 Id. at 398.
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Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have
never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an inde-
pendent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
proceeding. . . . This rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas
courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the
Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.141
The Court worried that “[f]ew rulings would be more disruptive of our fed-
eral system than to provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims
of actual innocence.”142  It also added that it had not “cast[ ] a blind eye
toward innocence.”143  Instead, as noted above, it had “held that a petitioner
otherwise subject to defenses of abusive or successive use of the writ may have
his federal constitutional claim considered on the merits if he makes a
proper showing of actual innocence.”144
After all of that, however, the Court stopped short of saying that actual
innocence is never cognizable in habeas corpus.  Instead, it equivocated, with
the following comment:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that in a
capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of “actual innocence” made
after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and
warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process
such a claim.  But because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining
claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital
cases, and the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often
stale evidence would place on the States, the threshold showing for such an
assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.  The showing made
by petitioner in this case falls far short of any such threshold.145
Although only by a crack, the door to a pure “actual innocence” claim was
left open by virtue of this passage.  Notably, a majority of the Justices agreed
that it would violate the Constitution to execute someone actually innocent
of the crime of conviction.  Justice O’Connor, writing for herself and Justice
Kennedy, began her concurring opinion with the statement “I cannot disa-
gree with the fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is
inconsistent with the Constitution.”146  Justice White, concurring in the judg-
ment only, wrote that he “assume[d] that a persuasive showing of ‘actual
innocence’ made after trial, even though made after the expiration of the
time provided by law for the presentation of newly discovered evidence,
would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in this case.”147
And Justice Blackmun, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Souter,
unequivocally stated that “[n]othing could be more contrary to contempo-
141 Id. at 400.
142 Id. at 401.
143 Id. at 404.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 417.
146 Id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
147 Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring).
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rary standards of decency or more shocking to the conscience than to exe-
cute a person who is actually innocent.”148  Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas found no legally cognizable problem in such an
action.
Thirteen years later, in House v. Bell, the Court found that petitioner
House’s claim of actual innocence was strong enough to overcome his proce-
dural default of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.149  House also
raised a freestanding claim of innocence, under which he “urge[d] the Court
to answer the question left open in Herrera.”150  The Court declined the invi-
tation, stating that even though the evidence of innocence House had
presented was strong enough to create a “gateway” to his constitutional
claim, it was not strong enough to satisfy “the threshold implied in Her-
rera.”151  So once again, the question of the stand-alone claim of innocence
was kicked down the road.
The Court came closest to grappling with that issue in a brief memoran-
dum order in response to an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus
filed by Troy Davis, who was attempting to challenge his Georgia conviction
and death sentence on actual innocence grounds.152  Rather than reject the
petition outright, the Court transferred it to the District Court for the South-
ern District of Georgia “for hearing and determination.”153  Its memoran-
dum order instructed the district court to “receive testimony and make
findings of fact as to whether evidence that could not have been obtained at
the time of trial clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence.”154  As Justice Ste-
vens’s concurring opinion reveals, seven of the state’s key witnesses against
Davis (who had been convicted of killing a police officer) had recanted their
trial testimony.155  Justice Stevens also had this to say about actual innocence:
Even if the court finds that § 2254(d)(1) [that is, AEDPA] applies in full, it is
arguably unconstitutional to the extent it bars relief for a death row inmate
who has established his innocence.  Alternatively, the court may find in such
a case that the statute’s text is satisfied, because decisions of this Court
clearly support the proposition that it “would be an atrocious violation of
our Constitution and the principles upon which it is based” to execute an
innocent person.156
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, saw things quite differently.  He
found it remarkable that the Court was ordering reconsideration of Davis’s
148 Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
149 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554 (2006) (applying the “gateway” standard of Schlup
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)).
150 Id.
151 Id. at 555.
152 See In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 952 (2009).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 953 (Stevens, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 953–54 (quoting In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 830 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting)).
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evidence, on his original petition for a writ of habeas corpus, even though
“every judicial and executive body that has examined petitioner’s stale claim
of innocence has been unpersuaded” and he could not envision what kind of
relief would be possible.157  In his view, AEDPA set the limits on the grounds
for granting a such a petition, and it allows for grants only if legal error can
be shown.  He insisted that “[t]his Court has never held that the Constitution
forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair
trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ inno-
cent.”158  And that claim is quite accurate: although it has never definitively
ruled out the possibility of such a claim, the Court has never found one
either.
Surely, however, a claim of innocence (or “actual innocence,” as it is
usually redundantly dubbed) should stand at the top of the hierarchy of rea-
sons for granting relief, even at such a late stage as a collateral petition—well
above a claim of a violation of Miranda rights, or a complaint that Confronta-
tion Clause rights were violated, or even a claim that the jury did not reflect a
fair cross-section of the community.  The reason the Court and Congress
have been reluctant to take this step, I suggest, is their fear that hordes of
prisoners would raise frivolous claims of innocence, and that the courts
would drown in trying to sort out which ones deserve plenary attention.
AEDPA recognizes innocence as a gateway claim, in its provision
allowing an evidentiary hearing on a claim that was not developed earlier in a
state court, if the applicant can satisfy these criteria:
(A) the claim relies on—
(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collat-
eral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered
through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.159
A petitioner who is asserting innocence must rely on subparts (A)(ii) and
(B), but note that subpart (B) demands a link between the asserted constitu-
tional error and the factfinder’s assessment of the evidence.  For the person
who has simply found new evidence—perhaps DNA evidence that conclu-
sively clears the defendant, or some other irrefutable proof of innocence—
that link may not exist.
Nonetheless, this part of AEDPA points the way toward a sensible treat-
ment of actual innocence.  A clear and demanding threshold standard is
essential, if the predictable flood of petitions is to be avoided.  And this hap-
pens to be a point on which Judge Friendly was not as precise as one could
wish.  His article suggests several different preliminary showings: “[A] colora-
157 Id. at 954 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 955.
159 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2018) (emphasis added).
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ble claim of innocence”;160 evidence “that casts some shadow of a doubt on
[the petitioner’s] guilt”;161 and most completely,
a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to
have been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it)
and evidence tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have
become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have enter-
tained a reasonable doubt of [petitioner’s] guilt.162
One could imagine building on the last formulation and insisting that
the petitioner wishing to assert a stand-alone claim of innocence must make
this showing not by a mere “fair probability,” but (as AEDPA suggests) by
clear and convincing evidence that could not have been uncovered by due
diligence in time for the trial and direct appeal.  It is notable in this connec-
tion that AEDPA also permits gateway innocence claims for second or succes-
sive petitions, though not freestanding claims.163  It would not take much to
tweak that language to permit an actual innocence claim.
CONCLUSION
Opponents of innocence as an independent ground for collateral relief
have characterized it as a simple fact and have urged that the time for deter-
mination of facts ends well before federal collateral review begins.  That may
well be true for ordinary facts.  But innocence is the ultimate question in any
criminal case: it is far more than a common historical fact, such as which city
someone was in on a particular day, or whether he was wearing certain
clothes, or even what blood type he has.  At the very least, innocence or guilt
is the ultimate conclusion based on the underlying facts and the law, and so
easily qualifies as a mixed question of law and fact.  And it is a mixed ques-
tion with a constitutional dimension: the entire purpose of constitutional
criminal procedure, taken as a whole, is to prevent the erroneous conviction
of an innocent person.  Imprisoning, or worse, executing, a person who is
innocent of the underlying crime would be a shocking exercise of govern-
ment power.  And there are other dimensions of actual innocence that
deserve attention as well.  For example, in light of cases such as Adkins v.
Virginia164 and Hall v. Florida,165 is it accurate to say that a person who is so
intellectually disabled that a particular punishment cannot be inflicted upon
him or her is “guilty” of a crime, or is it more accurate simply to say that while
the person committed the criminal acts, he or she is not responsible for
them?166  And if the person is not responsible, then is this the equivalent of
160 Friendly, supra note 4, at 142, 150, 160.
161 Id. at 142 (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
162 Id. at 160.
163 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).
164 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
165 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
166 See, e.g., Elizabeth Nevins-Saunders, Not Guilty as Charged: The Myth of Mens Rea for
Defendants with Mental Retardation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1419, 1437–50 (2012).
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innocence (recognizing that the state may nonetheless have the right to keep
the person in some form of detention because of potential dangerousness to
self or others)?167
These and other questions about the scope of an innocence claim can
be saved for another day.  For now, we can return to Judge Friendly’s original
question: Is Innocence Irrelevant?  His suggestion was to permit collateral
attacks by prisoners only in situations where the applicant supplements his
constitutional plea with a “colorable” claim of innocence.  It is unclear
whether, by phrasing it this way, he had in mind only “gateway” uses of actual
innocence, or if he meant to include the freestanding claim.  Although tight
restrictions on such a claim would be critical—perhaps the use of Judge
Friendly’s standard for “colorable” claims with an added pleading require-
ment to show facts that, if believed, would clearly and convincingly establish
innocence—some vehicle for these claims is essential.  The rule of law itself
demands no less.
167 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
